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2357 
such as Near v. Minnesota ex reI. Olson, 
283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 
(1931), are-precisely comparable to this 
case, in which a typical sanction imposed 
was the requirement that the group 
abandon its plan to meet in the college 
coffee shop. 
Prior cases dealing with First Amend-
ment rights are not fungible goods, and 
I think the doctrine of these cases sug-
gests two important distinctions. The 
government as employer or school ad-
ministrator may impose upon employees 
and students reasonable regulations that 
would be impermissible if imposed by 
the government upon all citizens. And 
there can be a constitutional distinction 
between the infliction of criminal pun-
ishment, on the one hand, and the impo-
sition of milder administrative or disci-
plinary sanctions, on the other, even 
though the same First Amen"iiment in-
terest is implicated by each. 
Because some of the language used by 
the Court tends to obscure these distinc-
tions, which I believe to be important, I 
concur only in the judgment. 
David GELBARD and Sidney Pamas, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
lJNITED STATES. 
UNITED STATES, Petitioner, 
v. 
Jogues EGAN and Anne 'Elizabeth 
Walsh. 
Nos. 71-110, 71-263. 
Argued March 2:7, 1972. 
Decided June 26, 1972. 
Civil contempt proceedings against 
witnesses before federal grand juries 
who refused to comply with cou,rt orders 
to testify. In No. 71-110, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, 443 F.2d 837, affirmed an ad-
judication of contempt. In No. 71-263, 
the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit, 450 F.2d 199 and 450 
F.2d 231, reversed adjudications of con-
tempt, and certiorari was granted. The 
Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Brennan, 
held that grand jury witnesses were en-
titled to invoke statutory prohibition 
against use before gran~ jury of evi-
. dence derived from interception of any 
wire or oral communication as defense· 
to charges of civil contempt brought on 
the basis of their refusal to obey court 
orders to testify before grand jury. 
No. 71-110 reversed and remanded; 
No. 71-263 affirmed. 
Mr. Justice Douglas concurred and 
filed opinion. 
Mr. Justice White concurred and 
filed opinion. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissented and 
filed opinion in which Mr. Chief Justice 
Burger and Mr. Justice Blackmun and 
Mr. Justice Powell joined. 
1. Grand Jury e=>36 
Grand jury witnesses were entitled 
to invoke statutory prohibition against 
use before grand jury of evidence de-
rived from interception of any wire or 
oral communication as defense to charge 
of civil contempt brought on the basis 
of their refusal to obey court orders to 
testify before grand jury. 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2515; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1826(a). 
2. Grand Jury e=>36 
A showing by witness before grand 
jury that interrogation which he refuses 
to answer would be based upon illegal 
interception of the witness' communica-
tions constitutes "just cause" for refus-
ing to comply with an order .of the court 
to testify before grand jury and pre-
cludes finding of contempt for such re-
fusal to testify. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2515; 
28 U.S.C.A. § 1826(a). 
See publication Words, and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
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3. Criminal Law <€;:::>394.3 
Grand Jury <€;:::>36 
Statute providing that, whenever 
any wire or oral communication has been 
intercepted, no part of the contents of 
such communic~tion and no evidence de-
rived therefrom may be received in evi-
dence in any proceeding before court, 
grand jury or other specified govern-
mental body serves not only to protect 
the privacy of communications, but also 
to insure that the courts do .not become 
partners to illegal conduct. 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2515. 
4. Grand Jury <€;:::>36 
Grand jury witness is not required 
to enforce the statutory prohibition 
against use before grand jury of inter-
cepted communications or evidence de-
rived therefrom by motion to suppress' 
suppression motions, as method of e -
forcing the statutory prohibition, m t 
be made in accordance with the rest ic-
tions upon forums, procedures, and 
grounds specified by statute aut oriz-
ing any aggrieved person in sp ified 
types of proceedings to move to s 
the contents of any intercepted ire or 
oral communication, or evidence derived 
therefrom. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 25 0, 2510 
(11),2515,2518(10) (a); 28 .S.C.A. § 
1826(a). 
Syllabus * 
Where a grand jury witness is ad-
judicated in civil contempt under 28 
U.S.C. § 1826(a) for refusing "without 
t 1 
* The syllabus constitutes no part of the 
opinion of the Court but has been pre-
pared by the Reporter of Decisions for 
the convenience of the reader. See Unit-
ed · States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber 
Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 
50 L.Ed. 499. 
I. Section 1826 (a) provides: 
" 'Vhenever a witness in any proceeding 
before or ancillary to any court or grand 
jury of the United States refuses with-
out just cause shown to comply with an 
order of the court to testify or provide 
other information, including any book, 
paper, document, · record, recordin~ or 
other material, the court, upon such re-
fusal, or when such refusal is duly 
just cause shown to comply with an or-
der of the court to testify," the witness 
may invoke as a defense 18 U.S.C. § 
515, which directs that "[ w ] henever 
a y wire ot oral communication has been 
in rcepte , no part of the contents of 
suc com unication and no evidence de-
rive th refrom may be received in evi-
dence i any proceeding in or 
before grand jury . ," 
since showing that the interrogation 
woul b based upon the illegal intercep-
tion of the witness' communications 
that 
Pp. 
110, 443 F.2d 837, reversed 
for petitioners 
Parnas. 
; No. 71-263, 450 F.2d 199 
31, affirmed. 
'gar, San Francisco, Cal., 
avid Gelbard and Sidney 
Daniel M. Fri dman, Washington, D. 
C., for the Unite States. 
Jack J. Levine, Philadelphia, Pa., for 
Joseph Egan and Anne Elizabeth Walsh 
pro hac vice, by special leave of Court. 
Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the 
opinion of the Court. 
These cases present challenges to the 
validity of adjudications of civil con-
tempt, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a),l 
brought to its attention, may summarily 
order his confinement at a suitable place 
until such time as the witness is willing 
to give such testimony or provide such 
information. No period of such confine-
ment shall exceed the life of-
"(1) the court proceeding, or 
"(2) the term of the grand jury, in-
cluding extensions, before which such re-
fusal to comply with the court order oc-
curred, but in no event shall such con-
finement exceed eighteen months." 
This provision was enacted as part of the 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. It 
was intended to codify the existing prac-
tice of the federal courts. S.Rep.No. 
91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 33, 56-57, 
148-149 (1969); H.R.Rep.No.91-1549, 
I 
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of witnesses before federal grand juries 
who refused to comply with court orders 
to testify. The refusals were defended 
upon the ground that interrogation was 
to be based upon information obtained 
from the witnesses' communications, al-
legedly intercepted by federal agents by 
means of illegal wiretapping and elec- . 
tronic surveillance. A provision of Title 
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 211, 
as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, di-
rects that H[w]henever any wire or oral 
communication has been intercepted, no 
part of the contents of such communica-
tion and no evidence derived therefrom 
may be received in evidence in any . 
proceeding in or before any 
grand jury, . . if the disclosure of 
that information would be in violation 
of this chapter." 18 U.S.C. § 2515.2 
The question presented is whether grand 
jury witnesses, in proceedings under 28 
U.S.C. § 1826(a), are entitled to invoke 
this prohibition of § 2515 as a defense to 
contempt charges brought against them 
for refusing to testify. In No. 71-110, 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that they are not entitled to do 
so. United States v. Gelbard, 443 F.2d 
837 (1971). In No. 71-263, the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, en 
bane, reached the cOI.1trary conclusion. 
In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199 (1971); In 
re Walsh, 450 F.2d 231 (1971). We 
granted certiorari. 404 U.S. 990, 92 
91st Cong., 2d Sess., 33, 46 (1970), U.S. 
Code Congo & Admin.News, p. 4007; see 
Shillitani V. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 
86 S.Ct. 1531, 16 L.Ed.2d 622 (1966). 
2. Section 2515 provides in full : 
"'Vhenever any wire or oral communica-
tion has been intercepted, no part of the 
contents of such communication and no 
evidence derived thereform may be re-
ceived in evidence in any trial, hearing, 
or other proceeding in or before any court, 
grand jury, department, officer, agency, 
regulatory body, legislative committee, or 
other authority of the United States; a 
State, or a political subdivision thereof if 
the disclosure of that informa~ion would 
be in violation of this chapter." 
3. The Third Circuit followed Egan in In 
re Maratea, 444 F.2d 499 (1971) (en 
S.Ct. 531, 30 L.Ed.2d 541 (1971).3 We 
d.isagree with the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit and agree with the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
No. 71-110. A federal district judge 
approved wiretaps by federal agents of 
the telephones of Perry Paul, an alleged 
bookmaker, and Jerome Zarowitz, 'a for-
mer executive of a Las Vegas casino. In 
the course of those taps, the agents over-
heard conversations between Paul and 
petitioner Gelbard and between Zarowitz 
and petitioner Parnas. Petitioners were 
subsequently called before a federal 
grand jury convened in Los Angeles to 
investigate possible violations of federal 
gambling laws. The Government as-. 
serted that petitioners would be ques-
tioned about third parties and that the 
questions would be based upon petition-
ers' intercepted telephone conversations. 
Petitioners appeared before the grand 
jury, but declined to answer any ques-
tions based upon their intercepted con-
versations until they were afforded an 
opportunity to challenge the legality of 
the interceptions. Following a hearing, 
the United States District Court for the 
Central District of C~lifornia found pe-
titioners in contempt and, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1826(a), committed them to cus-
tody for the life of the grand jury or 
until they answered the questions. 
No. 71-263. Respondents Egan and 
Walsh were called before a federal grand 
bane) . The District of Columbia Circuit 
has aligned itself with the Third, see In 
re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239 (1971), while 
the Xinth has continued to follow Gelbard, 
see Bacon v. United States, 446 F.2d 667 
(1971); Olsen v. United States, 446 F.2d 
912 (1971); In re Russo, 448 F.2d 369 
(1971); Reed V . United States, 448 F.2d 
1276 (1971); United States v. Reynolds, 
449 F.2d 1347 (1971). The First and 
Fifth Circuits have also adverted to the 
question. In re Marx, 451 F.2d 466 (CAl 
1971); In re Popkin, - F.2d -
(1972); Dudley v. United States, 427 
F.2d 1140 (CA5 1970). See also United 
States ex reI. Rosado v. Flood, 394 F.2d 
139 (CA2 1968); Carter v. United States, 
417 F.2d 384 (CA91969). 
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jury convened in Harrisburg, Pennsyl-
vania, to investigate, among other pos-
sible crimes, an alleged plot to kidnap ,a 
Government official. Pursuant to 18 
U .S.C. § 2514, both respondents were 
granted transactional ir:nmunity in re-
turn for their testimony. Respondents 
appeared before the grand jury, but re-
fused to answer questions on the ground, 
among others, that the questions were 
based upon information overheard from 
respondents by means of the Govern-
ment's illegal wIretapping and electronic 
surveillance. The Government did not 
reply to respondents' allegations.4 Fol-
lowing a hearing, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania found respondents in con-
tempt, and they we're also committed to 
custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (a) . 
Section 1826(a) expressly limits the 
adjudication of civil contempt to the 
case of a grand jury witness who "re-
fuses without just cause shown to com-
ply with an order of the court to testify." 
Our inquiry, then, is whether a showing 
that interrogation would be based upon 
the illegal interception of the witness's 
communications constitutes a showing of 
"just cause" that precludes a finding 
of contempt. The answer turns on the 
construction of Title III of the Omnibus 
Act.5 
I 
In Title III, Congress enacted a com-
preh,ensive scheme for the regulation of 
wiretapping and electronic surveillance. 
See United States v. United States , Dis-
trict Court, 405 U.S. -, at ---, 
92 S.Ct. -, at - - -, 32 L.Ed.2d 
-. Title III authorizes the intercep-
tion of private wire and oral communica-
tions, but only when law enforcement 
officials are investigating specified se-
rious crimes and receive prior judicial 
approval, an approval that may not be 
given except upon compliance with strin-
4. See n. 23, infra. 
5. In view of our disposition of these cases, -
we do not reach any of the constitutional 
issues tendered as to the right of a grand 
gent conditions. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 
2518(1)-(8). If a wire or oral commu-
nication is intercepted in accordance 
with the provisions of Title III, the con-
tents of the communication may be dis-
closed and used under certain circum-
stances. 18 U.S.C. § 2517. Except as 
expressly authorized in Title III, how-
ever, all interceptions of wire and oral 
communications are flatly prohibited. 
Unauthorized interceptions and the dis-
closure or use of information obtained 
through unauthorized interceptions are 
crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1), and the vic-
tim of such interception, disclosure, or 
use is entitled to recover civil damageS, 
18 U.S.C. § 2520. Title III also bars the 
use as evidence before official bodies of 
the contents and fruits of illegal inter-
ceptions, 18 U.S.C. § 2515, and provides 
procedures for moving to suppress such 
evidence in various proceedings, 18 U.S. 
C. § 2518(9 )-(10) . 
The witnesses in these cases were held, 
in contempt for disobeying court orders 
by refusing to produce evidence--their 
testimony-before grand juries. Conse-
quently, their primary contention is that 
§ 2515, the evidentiary prohibition of Ti-
tle III, afforded them a defense to the. 
contempt charges. In addressing that 
contention, we must assume, in the pres-
ent posture of these cases, that the Gov-
ernment has intercepted communications 
of the witnesses and that the testimony 
the Government seeks from them would 
be, within the meaning of § 2515, "evi-
dence derived" from the intercepted com-
munications. We must also assume that 
the communications were not intercepted 
in accordance with the specified proce-
dures and thus that the witnesses' poten-
tial testimony would be "disclosure" in 
violation of Title III. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2511 (1), 2517 (3). In short, we proceed 
on the premise that § 2515 prohibits the 
presentation to grand juries of the com-
pelled testimony of these witnesses. 
jury witness to rely upon the Fourth 
Amendment as a basis for refusing to an-
swer questions. We also note that the 
constitutionality of Title III is not chal-
lenged in these cases. 
J 
GELBARD v. UNITED STATES 2361 
Cite as 92 S.Ct. 23.')7 (1972) 
[1,2] The narrow question, then, is The Senate committee report that ac-
whether under these circumstances the companied Title III underscores the con~ 
witnes~es may invoke the prohibition of gressional policy: 
§ 2515 as a defense to contemp,t charges "Title III has as it dual purpose (1) 
brought on the basis of their refusal to protecting the privacy of wire and oral 
obey court orqers to testify. We think communications, and (2) delineating 
they may. on a uniform basis the circumstances 
and conditions under which the inter-
The unequivocal language of · § 2515 
expresses the fundamental policy adopt-
ed by Congress on the subject of wire-
tapping and electronic surveillance. As 
the congressional findings for Title III 
make plain, that policy is strictly to lim-
it the employment of those techniques 
of acquiring information: 
"To safeguard the privacy of innocent 
persons, the interception of wire or 
oral c~mmunications where none of the 
parties to the communication has con-
sented to the interception should he 
allowed only when authorized by a 
court of competent jurisdiction and 
should remain under the control and 
supervision of the authorizing court. 
Interception of wire and oral commu-
nications should further be limited to 
certain types of offenses and specific 
categories of crime with assurances 
that the interception is justified-and 
that the information obtained thereby 
will not be misused." § 801(d), 82 
Stat. 211.8 
6. " Paragraph (d). recognizes the responsible 
part that the judiciar.y must play in su-
pervising the interception of wire or oral 
communications in order that the privacy 
of innocent persons may be protected: 
. the interception or use of " wire 
or oral communications should only be 
on court order. Because of the import-
ance of privacy, such interceptions should 
further be limited to major offenses and 
care must be taken to 'insure that no mis-
use is made "of any information obtained." 
S.Rep.No.1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 89 
(1968) U.S.CodeCong. & Admin.News, 
p. 2177. 
7. In stating the problem addressed by Con-
gress in Title III, the Senate report noted 
that "[bjoth proponents and opponents of 
wiretapping and electronic surveillance 
agree that the present state of the law 
in this area is extremely unsatisfactory 
92 S.Ct.-148'12 
cepti~n of wire and oral communica-
tions may be authorized. To assure 
the privacy of oral and wi~e communi-
cations, title III prohibits all wiretap-
ping and electronic surveillance by 
persons other than duly authorized law 
enforcement officers engaged in the 
investigation or prevention of " speci-
fied types of serious crimes, and only 
after authorization of a court order 
obtained after a showing and finding 
of probable cause." S.Rep.No.1097, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess., 66 (1968); U.S. 
Code Congo & Admin.News, p. 2153. 
Hence, although Title III authorizes 
invasions of individual privacy under 
certain circumstances, the protection of 
privacy was an overriding congressional 
concern.' Indeed, the congressional 
findings articulate clearly the intent to 
utilize the evidentiary prohibition of § 
2515 to enforce the limitations imposed 
"by Title III upon wiretapping and elec-
tronic surveillance:" 
"In order to protect effectively the 
~privacy of wire and oral communica-
and ~hat the Congress should act to clarify 
the resulting confusion." S.Rep.No.1097, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess., 67 (1968), U.S.Code 
Congo & Admin.News, p. 2154. The re-
port agreed: "It would be, in short, dif-
ficult to devise a body of law from the 
point of view of privacy or justice more 
totally unsatisfactory " in its consequences." 
Id., at 69, U.S.Code Congo & Admin. 
News, p. 2156. The report then stressed 
that Title III would provide the protec-
tion for privacy lacking under the prior 
law: 
"The need for comprehensive, fair and ef-
fective reform setting uniform standards 
is obvious. New protections for privacy 
must be enacted. Guidance and super-
vision must be given to State and Federal 
law enforcement officers. This can only 
be accomplished through national legisla-
tion. This the subcommittee proposes." 
Ibid. (emphasis added). 
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tions, to 'protect the integrity of court 
and administrative proceedings, and 
to prevent the obstruction of interstate 
commerce, it is necessary for Congress 
to define on a uniform basis the cir-
cumstances and conditions under 
which the interception Qf wire , and 
oral communications may be author- ' 
ized, to prohibit any unauthorized in-
-terception of such communications, 
and the use of the contents thereof 
in evidence in courts and administra-
tive proceedings." § 801(b), 82 Stat. 
211 (emphasis added).8 
And the Senate report, like the congres-
sional findings, specifically addressed it-
self to the enforcement, by means of § , 
2515, of the limitations upon invasions 
of individual privacy: 
"Virtually all concede that the use 
of wiretapping or electronic surveil-
lance techniques by private unauthor-
ized hands has little justification 
where communications are intercept-
ed without the consent of one of the 
participants. Noone quarrels with 
the proposition that the unauthorized 
use 6f these techniques by law enforce-
ment agents should be prohibited. 
8. "Paragraph (b) recognizea that to protect 
the privacy of · wire and oral communica-
tions, to protect the integrity of .court and 
administrative proceeding[s) and to pre-
vent the obstruction of interstate com-
merce, it is necessary for Congress to de-
fine on a uniform basis the circumstances 
and conditions under which the intercep-
tion of wire or oral communications may 
be authorized. It also finds that all un-
authorized interception of such communi-
cations should be prohibited, as well as 
the use of the contents of unauthorized 
interceptions as evidence in courts and ad-
ministrative hearings." S.Rep.No.1097, 
-90th Cong., 2d Sess., 89 (1968) U.S.Code 
Congo & Admin.News, p. 2177 (emphasis 
added). 
9. "Section 2515 of the new chapter imposes 
an evidentiary sanction to compel compli-
ance with the other prohibitions of the 
chapter. It provides that intercepted wire 
or oral communications or evidence de-
rived therefrom may not be received in evi-
dence in any proceeding before any court, 
grand jury, department, officer, agency, 
. Only by striking at all aspects 
of the problem can privacy be ade-
quately protected. - The prohibition, 
too, must be enforced with all appro-
priate sanctions. Criminal penalties 
have their part to play. But other 
remedies must be afforded the victim 
of an unlawful invasion of privacy. 
Provision must be made for civil re-
course for damages. The perpetrator 
must be denied the fruits of his un-
lawful actions in civil and criminal 
proceedings. Each of these objectives 
is sought by the proposed legislation." 
S.Rep.No.1097, supra, at 69 U.S.Code 
Congo & Admin.News, P. 2156 (empha-
sis added.) 
[3] Section '2515 is thus central to 
the legislative scheme. Its importance 
as' a protection for "the victim of an un-
lawful invasion of privacy" could not be 
more clear.9 The purposes of § 2515 and 
Title III as a whole would be subverted 
were the plain command of § 2515 ig-
nored when the victim of an illegal inter-
ception is called as a witness before a 
grand jury and asked questions based 
upon that interception. Moreover, § 2515 
serves not .only to protect the privacy 
of communications,t° but also to ensure 
regulatory body, legislative committee, or 
other authority of the United States, a 
State, or a political subdivision of a State, 
where the disclosure of that information 
would be in violation of this chapter. 
. [I)t is not limited to criminal 
proceedings. SueD a suppression rule is 
necessary and proper to protect privacy. 
The provision thus forms an integral part 
of the system of limitations designed to 
protect privacy. Along with the criminal 
and civil remedies, it should serve to guar-
antee that the standards of the new chap--
ter will sharply curtail the unlawful in-
terception of wire and oral communica-
tions." S.Rep.No.1097, 90th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 96 (1968) U.S.Code Congo & Admin. 
News, p. 2184 (citations omitted). 
10. Congressional concern with the protec-
tion of the privacy of communications is 
evident- also in the specification of what 
is to be protected. "The proposed legis-
lation is intended . to protect the privacy 
of the communication itself 
S.Rep.No.1097; 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 90 
(1968) U.S.Code Cong. & !Admfn.News 
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that the courts do not become partners who is herself the victim of the illegal 
to illegal conduct: the evidentiary wiretapping, to jail for refusal to par-
prohibition was enacted also "to protect ticipate in the exploitation of that crime 
the. integrity of court and administrative in violation of the explicit command of 
proceedings." Consequently, to order a Section 2515 is to stand our whole sys-
grand jury witness, on pain of imprison- tern of criminal justice on its head." 
ment, to disclose evidence that § 2515 In re Evans, 452 F .2d 1239, 1252 (D.C. 
bars ,in unequivocal terms is both to Cir. 1871) (Wright, J., concurring). 
thwart the congressional objective of 
protecting individual privacy by exclud-
ing such evidence and to entangle the 
courts in the illegal acts of Government 
agents. 
In sum, ' Congress simply cannot be 
understood to have sanctioned orders to 
produce evidence excluded from grand 
jury proceedings by § 2515. Contrary to 
the Government's assertion that the ' in-
vasion of privacy is over and done with, 
to compel the testimony of these wit-
nesses compounds the statutorily pro-
scribed invasion of their privacy by add-
ing to the injury of the interception the 
insult of cOplpelled disclosure. And, of 
course, Title III makes illegal not only 
unauthorized interc~ptions but also the 
disclosure and use of information obtain-
ed through such interceptions. 18 U.S. 
C. § 2511(1) ; see 18 U.S.C. § 2520. 
Hence, if the prohibition of § 2515 is not 
available as a defense to the contempt . 
charge, disclosure through compelled tes-
timony makes the witness the victim, 
once again, of a federal crime. Finally, 
recognition of § 2515 as ,a defense "re-
lieves judges of the anomalous duty of 
finding a person in civil contempt. for 
failing to cooperate w.ith the prosecutor 
in a course of conduct which, if pursued 
unchecked, could subject the prosecutor 
himself to heavy civil and criminal pen-
alties." In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199, 220 
(CA 3 1971) (Rosenn, J., concurring) . 
"And for a court, on petition of the exec-
utive department ; to sentence a witness, 
p. 2178. As defined in Title III, "'con-
tents,' when used with respect to any wire 
or oral communication, includes any in-
formation concer'ning the identity of the 
parties to such communication or the 
existence, substance, purport, or meaning 
of that communication." 18 U.S.C. § 
2510(8). The definition thus "include[s] 
jill aspects of the communication itself. 
II 
Our conclusion that § 2515 is an avail-
able defense to the contempt charge finds 
additional support in 18 U.S.C. § 3504, 
enacted as part of the Organized Crime 
Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 935. Sec-
tion 3504 is explicit confirmation that 
Congress intended that grand jury wit-
nesses, in reliance upon the prohibition 
of § 2515, might refuse to answer ques-
tions based upon the illegal interception 
of their communications. 
Section 3504 (a) (1) provides: 
"In any 
before any . 
proceeding in or 
. grand jury . 
"(1) Upon a claim by a party ag-
grieved that evidence is inadmissible 
because iUs the primary product of an 
unlawful act or because it was obtained 
by the exploitation of an unlawful act, 
the opponent of the claim shall affirm 
or deny the occurrence ' of the alleged 
unlawful act." 
Under § 3504(a) (2), disclosure of in-
formation relating to the claim of in-
admissibility is not mandatory if the 
"unlawful act" took place before June 
19, 1968, the effective date of Title III. 
Under § 3504(a) (3), there is a five-year 
limitation upon the consideration of a 
claim of inadmissibility based upon "the 
exploitation of an unlawful act" that took 
place before June 19, 1968. Section 3504 
(b), by reference to Title III, defines an 
No aspect , including the identity of the 
parties, the substance of the communica-
tion between them, or the fact of the com-
munication itself, is excluded.. The pri-
vacy of the communication to be pro-
tected i~ intended to be comprehensive.'; 
S.R ep.No.1097, supra, at 91, U.S.Code 
Congo & Admin.News, p. 2179. 
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"unlawful act" as one involving illegal 
wiretapping or electronic sllrveil1ance.u 
Section 3504, then, establishes proce-
dures to be followed "upon a claim by a 
party aggrieved that evidence is inadmis-
sible because" of an illegal interception. 
And § 3504 tracks § 2515 in its applica-
tion to grand jury proceedings. Indeed, 
H[t]he language used in defining the 
types of proceedings, types of forums, and 
jurisdictions in which section 3504 is ap-
plicable was taken from 18 U.S.C. § 
2515." S.Rep.No.91-617, 91st Cong., 
1st Sess., 154 (1969) .12 In the a~plica-
tion of § 3504 to "any pro-
ceeding in or before any grand 
.jury," ':a party aggrieved" can only be a 
witness, for there is no other "party" to . 
a grand jury proceeding. Moreover, a 
"claim that evidence is in-
admissible" can only be a claim that the 
witness's potential testimony is inadmis-
sible. Hence, § 3504, by contemplating 
"a claim by a party aggrieved that evi-
dence is inadmissible because" of an il-
legal interception, necessarily recognizes 
that grand jury witnesses may rely upon 
1 I . Section 3504 provides in full : 
" (a) In any trial, hearing, or other pro-
ceeding in or before any court, grand jury, 
department, officer, agency, regulatory 
body, or other a uthority of the United 
States-
" (1) upon a claim by a pa rty aggrieved 
that evidence is inadmissible because it 
is t he prima ry product of an unlawful 
act or because it was obtained by the 
exploita t ion of an unlawful act , the 
opponent of the claim shall affirm or 
deny the occurrence of the alleged un-
lawful act ; 
" (2 ) disclosu re of information for a 
determination if evidence is inadmissible 
because it is the primary product of an 
unlawful act occurring prior to June 19, 
1968, or because it was obtained by the 
eXl>loitation of an unlawful act oc-
curring prior to June 19, 1968, shall not 
be required unless such information may 
be relevant to a pending claim of such 
inadmissibility ; and 
" (3) no claim shall be considered that 
evidence of an event is inadmissible on 
the ground that such evidence was ob-
tained by the exploitation of an unlawful 
act occurring prior to June 19, 1968, if 
such' event occurred more' than five years 
after such allegedly unlawful act . 
the prohibition of § 2515 in claiming that 
the evidence sought from them is in-
admissible in the grand jury proceedings. 
Upon such a claim by a grand jury wit- . 
ness, the Government, as "the opponent 
of the claim," is required under § 3504 
(a) (1) to "affirm or deny the occur-
rence of the alleged" illegal interception. 
Section 3504 thus confirms that Congress 
meant that grand jury witnesses might 
defend contempt charges by invoking the 
prohibition of § 2515 against the com-
pelled disclosure of evidence obtained in 
violation of Title III. 
The Government urges, however, that 
the procedures prescribed in § 3504 are 
limited in application to claims of in-
admissibility based upon illegal intercen-
tions that took place before June 19,1968, 
and that § 3504 ~nnot, therefore, pro-
vide support for a construction of § 2515. 
We disagree. While subsections (a) (2) 
and (a) (3) apply only when the illegal 
interception took place before June 19, 
1968, it is clear both from tlre face of § 
3504 13 and from its legislative history 
that subsection (a) (1), imposing the 
" (b) As used in this section 'unlawful 
act' means any act the use of any elec-
tronic, mechanical, or other device (as 
defined in section 2510 (5) of this title) 
i~ viola tion of the Constitution or laws 
of the United S tates or any regulation 
or standard promulgated pursuant there-
to." 
No question as to the constitutionality of 
§ 3504 is raised in these cases. 
12. "The only exception is that section 
350 [4] omits legisla ti ve committees." S. 
R ep.No.91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 
154 (1969) . In addition, the House 
amended § 3504, as passed by the Senate, 
so that, unlike § 2515, it "applies only 
to trials and other proceedings conducted 
under authority of the United States." 
H .R.Rep.No.91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d 
Sess., 51 (1970), U.S.Code Congo & 
Admin.News p. 4027. 
13. The references to June 19, 1968, ap-
pear only in subsections (a ) (2) and 
(a ) (3) . Subsection (a) (1) does not 
similarly limit the t erm "unlawful act" 
with the phrase "occurring prior to June 
19, 1968." See n . 11, supra. It is 
thus plain on t11e face of § .3504 that 
Congress did not make the duty imposed 
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duty upon "the opponent of the claim" to 
"affirm or deny the occurrence of the al-
leged" illegal interception, . is not similar-
ly limite~. 
The omission of the June 19, 1968, date 
from subsection (a) 0) was not in-
advertent. Subsection (a) (1 ) was not 
in the original Senate bill, although the 
bill did contain counterparts of present 
subsections (a) (2) and (a) (3) without 
the June 19, 1968, or any other date 
limitation.14 · See Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and 
Procedures of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee on S. 30 et aI., 91st Cong., 1st 
Sess., 102-105 (1969) . Subsection (a) 
(1 ) was added at the suggestion of the 
Department of Justice. At that time the 
Department followed the practice of 
searching Government files for informa-
tion about wiretaps and eavesdrops. The 
Department advised the Senate Judiciary 
Committee that while it had been "con-
duct[ing] such examinations as a matter 
of policy even in cases where no motion 
hard] been filed defendants 
should be assured such an examination 
by a specific requirement of law rather 
than hav[ing] to rely upon the continued 
viability of a current policy." Id ., at 
553. The Senate report on § 3504 ex-
plained that "since [subsection (a ) (1)] 
requires a pending claim as a predicate to 
disclosure, it sets aside the present waste-
ful practice of the Department of Justice 
in searching files without a motion from 
a defendant." S.Rep.N 0.91-617, 91st 
Cong., 1st Sess., 154 (1969). 
by subsection (a) (1 ) depen,lent upon the 
clnte of the alleged illegal interception. 
14. T he Senate pnssecl § 3504 in a form that , 
so fn r ns is pertinent to the issue befo re 
us, ,liffered from the section as fin ally, 
enacted only in that subsections (a) (2) 
and (a) (3) ill the Senate version were 
not limited in npplication to ilIegnl inter-
ceptions that took place befo re .Tune 19, 
1968. See S.R ep.No.91-617, 91st Cong., 
1st Sess., 15, 70 . (1969) . 
15. " [Subsection (a ) (1)] provides that in 
nn attack upon the admissibility of evi-
dence because it is the product of an un-
The reason assigned in the Senate for 
enacting subsection (a) (1) was thus as 
applicable to post- as it was to pre-June 
19, 1968, interceptions. The same w~ 
true of the House. There subsection (a) 
(1) was supported on the groqnd that it 
would be beneficial to the victims of 
illegal interceptions. Senator McClellan, 
for example, testified before the House 
Judiciary Subcommittee that subsection 
(a) (1) "places upon the GovernIl).ent an 
affirmative duty to answer a claim that 
evidence is inadmissible because of un-
lawful investigative conduct." "The 
first requirement [of § 3504], that the 
Gov~rnment admit or deny the occur-
rence of the alleged invasion of the de-
fendant's rights, actually places or 
codifies a burden upon the Government, 
rather than the defendant." Hearings 
before Subcommittee No.5 of the House 
Judiciary Committee on S. 30 et aI., 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess., 84, 104 (1970). Other 
witnesses thought the provision unneces-
sary,lll Indeed, one organization sub-
mitted a report that disapproved sub-
section (a) (1) on the ground that the 
Government should admit illegalities 
without a prior claim. Id. at 562 (Sec-
tion of Criminal Law of the American 
Bar Association). It is also significant 
that congressional questioning of a repre-
sentative of the Department of Justice 
at the hearings was directed to the De-
partment's views on the insertion of a 
date limitation only in subsections (a) 
(2) and (a) (3). Id., at 659;· see the 
Department's written response, id. at 
675-676. 
lawful net ., the opponent of 
such plnim shall affirm or deny the 
alleged unlawful act . . . In this 
respect , [§ 3504] is unnecessary." H ear-
ings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the 
House Judiciary Committee on S. 30 et 
aI. , 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 399 (1970) (re-
port of the Committee on F ederal Legisla-
tion of the New York County Lawyers' 
Associa t ion) . "That is the law now by 
Supreme Court decision. [Subsection (a) 
(1)] ndds nothing to what exists right 
now." [d. , at 513 (testimony of Lawrence 
Speiser, representing the American Civil 
Liberties Union) . 
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The June 19, 1968, date was inserted 
in subsections (a) (2) and (a) (3) after 
the conclusion of the House hearings. It 
is apparent from the House report that 
only subsections (a) (2) and (a) (3) of 
the Senate version were to be limited by 
the June 19, 1968, date and that sub-
section (a ) (1) was to be operative with-
out regard to when the alleged illegal 
interception may have taken place: 
"Paragraph (1) provides that upon 
a claim by an aggrieved party that evi-
dence is inadmissible because it is the 
primary product of an· unlawful act, or 
because it was obtained by the exploita-
tion of an unlawful act, the opponent 
of the claim must affirm or deny the 
occurrence of the alleged unlawful act. 
Under this provision, 'upon a charge by 
the defendant with standing to chal-
lenge the alleged unlawful conduct, the 
Government would be ·required to af-
firm or deny that an unlawful act 
involving electronic surveillance had in 
fact occurred. If such an unlawful act 
had in fact occurred, paragraph (2), 
below, will govern disclosure of the 
contents of the electronic surveillance 
records or transcripts to the defendant 
and his counsel, unless paragraph (3) 
16. Congress, of course, was primarily con-
cerned with "certain evidentiary problems 
creat ed by electronic surveillance con-
ducted by the Government prior to the 
enactment of [Title III] on June 19, 
1968, which provided statutory' authority 
for obtaining surveillance warrant s in 
certain t ypes of criminal investiga tions 
(18 U .S.C. 2516) ." H.R.Rep.No.91-1549, 
91st Cong., 2d Sess" 50 (1970) U .S. Code 
Congo & Admin.News p. 4026. As the ' 
Senate report noted, however, § 3504 ap-
plies to " [c]ivil ' as well as criminal pro-
ceedings. ., rega rdless of whether 
a government or governmental body or 
officer is or is not a pa rty or witness." 
S.Rep.No.91-617, 91st Cong., 1s t Sess. , 
154 (1969). Moreover , "unlawful acts," 
as defined in § 31?04(b) , may be "act s , of 
private citizens as well as acts of Federal 
or State officials." Ibid. 
17. "Under pa ragra ph (2) disclosure of the 
information shall be required to be made 
to a defendant who has demons trated the 
illegality of the electronic surveillance 
(occurring p rior to June 19, 1968 ) and his 
applies." H.R.Rep.No.91-1549, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess., 51 (1970) , U.S.Code 
Congo & Admin.News, p. 4027. 
This explanation demonstrates that "the 
opponent of the claim" 16 has a duty to 
"affirm or deny" whenever "a party ag-
grieved" "claim[s] that evi-
dence is inadmissible because it is" 
derived from an illegal interception. The 
date June 19, 1968, becomes relevant only 
after it is determined that an illegal 
interception took place and an issue thus 
arises as to disclosure of information 
bearing on the claim.I7 
III 
The Government argues, finally, that 
while § 2515 could be construed to allow 
a grand jury witness to invoke its 
prohibition as a defense ' to a contempt 
charge, "[i]f this section were the only 
relevant portion of [Title-III] ," Brief in 
No. 71-263, at 19, proceedings before 
grand juries are omitted ft:om another 
provision of Title III, § 2518(10) (a), 
that authorizes "[a]ny aggrieved per-
son," 18 in specified types of proceedings, 
to "move to suppress the contents of any 
intercepted wire or oral communicat,ion, 
or evidence derived' therefrom." 19 But 
'standing where such information is or 
'may be' relevant to a claim of inadmis-
sibilit y. In cases where the electronic 
surveillance occurred on or a fte r June 
19, 1968, disclosure is manda tory where 
illegality and st anding are . demonstrat ed. 
T he provis ion thus alters the procedure 
announced in Alderina n v. United Stat es, 
89 S.Ct. 961, 394 U. S. 165, 22 L.Ed.2d 
176 (1968) [ sic ] with respect to 'unlawful 
acts' commitfed prior to J une 19, 1968." 
H .R.Rep.No.91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess ., 
51 (1970), U .S.Code Congo & Admin. 
News p. 4027. 
18. An "aggrieved person," for purposes of 
§ 2518 (10) (a) , is " a person who ~as a 
party to a ny intercepted wire or oral 
communication or a person against whom 
the interception was directed." 18 U.S. 
C. § 2510(11); see S.Rep.No.1097, 90th 
Cong., 2d Sess., · 91, 106 (1968 ) , U.S. 
Code . Congo & Admin.News, p. 2112. 
19. Sect ion 2518 (10) provides in pertinent 
pa rt : . 
" Any aggrieved person in a ny trial, hear-
ing, or p roceeding in or before any court. 
\ 
,. 
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it does not follow from the asserted omis-
sion of grand jury proceedings from the 
suppression provision that grand jury 
witnesses cannot invoke § 2515 as a 
defense in a contempt proceeding under 
28 U.S.C. § 1826(a).20 The congressional 
concern with the applicability of § 2518 
(10) (a) in grand jury proceedings, so' 
far as it is discernible from the Senate 
report, wa.s apparently that defendants 
and potential defendants might be able to 
utilize suppression motions to impede the 
issuance of indictments: "Normally, 
there is no limitation on the character of 
evidence that may be presented to a grand 
jury, which is enforcible by an individual. 
(Blue v. United States, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 384 
U.S. 251 [16 L.Ed.2d 510] (1965) [sic].) 
There is no intent to change this general 
rule." S.Rep.No.1097, 90th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 106 (1968), U.S.Code Congo & Ad-
min.News, p. 2195. The "general rule," 
as illustrated in Blue, is that a defendant 
is not entitled to have his indictment dis-
missed before trial simply because the 
Government "acquire[d] incriminating 
evidence in violation of the [law]," even 
if the "tainted evidence was presented to 
the grand jury." 384 U.S., at 255. and n. 
3, 86 S.Ct., at 1419; see Lawn V. United 
States, 355 U.S. 339, 78 S.Ct. 311, 2 L. 
Ed.2d 321 (1958); Costello V. United 
States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 
L.Ed. 397 (1956).Eut that rule has 
nothing whatever to do with the situation 
of a grand jury witness who has refused 
(Iel)artment, officer, agency, regulatory 
body, or other authority of the United 
States, a State, or a political subdivision 
thereof, may move to suppress the con-
tents of any intercepted wire or oral com-
m\mication, or evidence derived therefrom 
- . -
While on its face § 2518(10) (n) al)l)lies 
to grand jury proceedings, when com-
pared with the list of proceedings in 
§ 2515, see n. 2, supra, it appears that 
"grand jury" was omitted from the list 
in § 2518(10) (a). . 
20. "Because no person is a party as such 
to a grand jury proceeding, the provi-
sion does not envision the making of a 
motion to suppress in the context of such 
a proceeding itself. It is the 
intent of the provision only that- when a 
motion to suppress is granted in an-
to testify and attempts. to def~nd a sub-
sequent charge of con~mpt. Hence, we 
cannot agree that the Senate report ex-
pressed the view that a grand jury wit-
ness would be foreclosed from raising 
the § 2515 defense in a contempt pro-
ceeding under § 1826(aY. 
[4] Furthermore, grand jury wit-
nesses do not normally discover whether 
they may refuse to answer questions by 
filing motions to suppress their potential 
testimony: The usual procedure is, upon 
the Government's motion, to have a court 
order a grand jury witness to testify 
upon penalty of contempt for nqncom-
p}iance. Section 1826(a) embodies that 
traditional procedure. The asserted 
omission of grand jury proceedings from 
§ 2518(10) (a) may well reflect congres~ 
sional acceptance of that · procedure as 
adequate in these cases. Consequently, 
we cannot suppose that Congress, by 
providing procedures for suppression mo- _ 
tions, intended to deprive grand jury 
witnesses of the § 2515 defense that 
would otherwise be available to them. 
Although the Government points to state-
ments in the Senate report to the Elffect 
that § 2518(10) .<a) "limits" § 2515, we 
read those statements to mean that sup-
. pression motions, as a method of 
enforcing the prohibition of § 2515, must 
be made in accordance with the restric-
tions upon forums, procedures, and 
grounds specified in § 2518(10) (a).21 
other context, its scope may include use 
in a future grand jury proceeding." ·S. 
Rep.No.1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 106 
(1968), U.S.Code Congo & Admin.News, 
p. 2195. This assertion is not' unambig-
uous, for motions to suppress evidence 
to be presented to a grand jury would 
presumably be made in court. 
21. "This definition [§ 2510 (.11)] defines 
the class of those who are entitled to . 
in voke the suppression sanction of sec-
tion 2515 through the motion 
to suppress provided for by section 2518 
(10) (a) " S.Rep.No.1097, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess., 91 (1968), U.S. 
Code Congo & Admin.News, p. 2179. "The 
provision [§ 2515] must, of course, be 
read in light of section 2518(10) (a) . . 
which defines the class entitled to make' a 
motion to suppress." Id., at 96, U.S. 
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit in No. 71-110 is 
reversed and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.22 The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals for the Third. Circuit in No. 71-
263 is affirrned.23 
It is so ordered. 
Affirmed in part, reversed and re-
manded in part. 
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, concurring. 
Although I join in the opinion of the 
Court, I believe that, independently of 
any statutory I refuge which Congress 
may choose to provide, the Fourth 
Amendment shields a grand jury witness 
from any question (or any subpoena) . 
. which is based upon information gar-
nered from searches which invade his 
own constitutiQ..nally protected privacy. 
I would hold that Title III of the 1968 
Act offends the Fourth Amendment, as 
does all wiretapping and bugging, for 
reasons which I have often expressed 
elsewhere. E . g., Cox v. United· States, 
405 U.S. - , 92 S.Ct. 1783, 32 L.Ed.2d 
136 ; Williamson v. United States, 404 
U.S. -, 92 S.Ct. 1323, 31 L.Ed.2d 487; 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359, 
88 S.Ct. 507, 515, 19 L.Ed.2d 576; Ber-
ger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64, 87 S.Ct. 
1873, 1886t 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 ; Osborn 
v._ United States, 385 U.S. 323, 340, 87 
-S.Ct. 429, 438, 17 L.Ed.2d 394 ; Pugach 
v. Dollinger, 365 U.S v 458, 459, 81 S.Ct. 
650, 5 L.Ed.2d 678 ; On Lee v. Uniteq 
States, 343 U.S. 747, 762, 72 S.Ct. 967; 
976, 96 L.Ed. 1270. In each of the pres-
Code Congo & Admin.News, p. 2185. "This 
provision [ § 2518 (10) (a) ] must be read 
in connection with sections 2515 and 
2517. . which it limits. It pro-
vides tbe remedy for the right created by 
section 2515." I d. , at 106, · U.S.Code 
Congo & Admin.News, p. 2195. 
22. B ecause the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals erroneously held that 
grand jury witnesses have no right to 
invoke a § 2515 defense in contempt pro-
ceedings under § 1826 (a) , we need not de-
cide whether Gelbard and Parnas may 
refuse to answer questions if the intercep-
ent cases a grand jury witness seeks to 
prove and vindicate suspected unconsti-
tutional seizures of his own telephone 
conversations. And, in every relevant 
respect, the proceedings below were in 
striking parallel to those in Silverthorne 
Lumber CO. V. United States, 251 U.S. 
385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319. 
In that case, after federal agents un-
lawfully seized papers belonging to the 
Silverthornes and to their lumber com-
pany, the documents were returned upon 
order of the court. In the interim, how-
ever, the agents had copied them. After 
returning the seized originals, the prose-
cutor attempted to regain possession of 
them by issuing a grand jury subpoena 
duces tecum. When the respondents re-
fused to comply with the subpoena they 
were convicted of contempt. In revers-
ing those judgments, this Court through 
Mr. Justice Holmes, held that the Gov-
ernment was barred from reaping any 
fruit from its forbidden act and wove 
into our constitutional fabric the cele- . 
brated maxim that "the essence of a pro-
vision forbidding the acquisition of evi-
dence in a certain way is that not merely 
evidence sCI acquired shall not be used 
before the Court but that it shall not be 
used at all." 251 U.S., at 392, 40 S.Ct., 
at 183. 
Petitioners Gelbard and Parnas and re-
spondents Egan and Walsh occupy posi-
tions which,are virtually identical to that 
of the Silverthornes and their company. 
They desire to demonstrate that but for 
unlawful surveillance of them the grand 
jury would not now be seeking testimony 
from them. And, as in Silverthorne, 
t ions of their con versations were pur-
suant to court order. That is a mat-
ter for the District Court to consider 
in the first instance. 
23. The Court of Appeals vacated the judg-
ments of contempt and remanded for hear-
ings to determine whether the questions 
asked respondents resulted from the illegal 
interception of their communications. 450 
F .2d, at 217. Although, in this Court, 
the Government now denies that there 
was any overhearing, in view of our af-
firmance that is a matter for the District 
Court to consider in the fi rst instance. 
1 -
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they are the victims of the alleged viola- v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222, 88 
tions, seeking to mend no one's privacy S.Ct. 2008, 2010, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047; and 
other than their. own. Finally, here, as Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 
there, the remedy preferred is permis- 171, 177, 89 S.Ct. 961, 965, 968-969, 
sion to refuse to render the requested -22 L.Ed.2d 176, these witnesses deserve 
information. opportunities to prove their allegations 
Unless Silverthorne is to be overruled 
and uprooted from those decisions which 
have followed it, such as Nardone v. 
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-341, _60 
S.Ct. 266, 267-268, 84 L.Ed. 307; Benan-
ti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 103, 78 
S.Ct. 155, 159, 2 L.Ed.2d 126 ; Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.Ct. 
1437, 1444, 4 - L.Ed.2d 1669; Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 
1687-=-1688, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081; Wong Sun 
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 
S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; Harrison 
I . At oral a rgument, counsel for the United 
States contended that Silverthorne Lum-
ber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 
40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319, was dis-
tinguishable. First, it was said that in 
this case there has yet been no showing of 
Ulegal surveillance. Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. 
The point is, however, that these ' wit-
nesses claim to be able to make such a 
showing, although none of the trial 
courts below have permitted hea~ings 
on the issue. Second, it was also 
argued that Silverthorne was inapposite 
because there the very papers seized un~ 
lawfully were the ones later sought under 
the court's subpoena. Ibid. But there is 
little doubt that Justice Holmes' reason-
ing would also have relieved the Silver-
thornes from testifying before the grand 
jury as to the contents of the purloined 
papers. 
2. Three of the cases cited by the Solicitor 
General stand for nothing more than the 
rule that. a defendant may not challenge 
prior to trial the evidence from which the 
indictment was ' drawn. Costello v. 
United States,-350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 
100 L.Ed. 397; Lawn v. United States, 
355 U.S. 339, 78 S.Ct. 311, 2 L.Ed.2d 
321 ; United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 
86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510. To be 
sure, the other authorities cited rejected 
various privileges from testifying but only 
for reasons which are not in conflict 
with Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United 
States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 
L.Ed. 319. For example, in Murphy v. 
'Vaterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S. 
92 S.Cl.-149 
and, if successful, to withhold from the 
Government any , further rewards of its 
"dirty business." Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 470, 48 S.Ct. 564, 
575,72 L . Ed. 944 (Holmes, J ., dissent-
ing). 
The Solicitor General does not propose 
that Silverthorne be overruled. N or does 
he deny its remarkable similarity. In-
deed, his analysis of the constitutional 
issue at stake here fails even to mention 
that landmark decision.1 And none of 
the precedents cited by him detract from 
Silverthorne's vitality.2 
Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678; and Piemonte 
V. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 81 ' S.Ct. 
1720, 6 L .EI1.2d 1028, in light of our 
dispositions in those cases, no threat-
ened constitutional violation remained' as 
a predicate for a privilege: For in 
lIfU1'phy we eliminated the threat that 
testimony to a state granl1 jury given in 
exchange for a state immunity grant 
could, despite the witness' fears to the 
contrary, be used against him by other 
jurisdictions. And in P'iemonte the Fifth 
Amendment basis for declining to answer 
was dissolved by the majority's finding 
that there had been a proper gJ:.ant of 
immunity. True, Goldstein v. United 
States, 316 U.S. 114, 121,62 S.Ct. 1000, 
1004, 86 L.Ed. 1312, and Alderman v. 
Unitell States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 
961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176, denied standing to-
defendants to suppress the fruits of 
Fourth Amendment injuries to others, but 
that issue is not presented here inasmuch 
as all of these movants purported to be 
victims of intel'p.epted conversations. 
Finally, Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 
273, 39 S.Ct. 468, 63 L.Ed. 979, held that 
a grand jury witness may not withholll 
evidence solely because he believes that the 
statutes (which the grand jury suspects 
may have been violated) are unconstitu-
tional. Tliat contention, of course, has 
not been tendered by these grand jury 
witnesses. Moreover, Blair itself recog-
nizes that "for special reasons a ,witness 
may be excused from telling all that he 
knows." Id., 281, 39 S.Ct. 471. "Spe-
cial reasons" presumably was meant to 
include Fourth Amendment grounds, as 
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Rather, the Government treats this de-
cision as a "novel extension" of Fourth 
Amendment protections, leaning heavily 
upon the observation that the exclusiono-
ary rule has never been extended to "pro-
vide that illegally seized evidence is iIi-
admissible against anyone for any pur-
pose." Alderman, supra, 394 U.S. at 175, 
'89 S.Ct. at 967. This aphorism is con-
travened, concludes the Solicitor General, 
by any result permitting a nondefendant 
to "suppress" evidence sought to be in-
troduced at another's trial or to withhold 
testimony from a grand jury investiga-
tion of someone else. 
. To be sure, no majority of this Court 
has ever held that "anything which de-
ters illegal searches is thereby command-
ed by the Fourth Amendment." I d. , 174, 
89 S.Ct., 967. But that concern is not at 
stake here. No one is attempting to as-
sert vicariously the rights of others. 
Here it is only necessary to adhere to 
the basic principle that victims of uncon-
stitutional practices are themselves en-
titled to effective remedies. For, "where 
federally protected rights have been in-
vaded, it has been the rule from the be-
ginning that courts will be alert to ad-
just their remedies so as to grant the 
necessary relief." Bell v. Hood, 327 
U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 773, 777, 90 L.Ed. 
939. And see Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 
91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619. 
The fact that the movants below 
sought to withhold evidence \ does not 
transform these cases into unusual ones. 
A witness is often permitted to retain ex-
clusive custody of information where a 
contrary course would jeopardize import-
ant liberties such as First Amendment 
guarantees, Watkins v. United States, 
354 U.S. 178, 77 S.Ct. 1F3, 1 L.Ed.2d 
1273; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 
463,78 S.Ct. 1163, 1172, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 ; 
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigat-
was permitted shortly thereafter in Silvet·· 
thorne. 
3. E. g., Alexander v. United States, 138 
U.S. 353, 11 S.Ct. 350, 34 L.Ed. 954 
(lawyer-client); Blau v. United States, 
ing Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 83 S.Ct. 
889, 9 L.Ed.2d 929 i Baird v. State Bar, 
401 U.S. 1, 6-7, 91 S.Ct . 702, 705-706, 
27 L.Ed.2d 639; In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 
23, 91 S.Ct. 713, 27 L.Ed.2d 657 ; Fifth 
Amendment privileges, Hoffman v. Unit-
ed States, 341 U.S. 479, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 
L.Ed. 1118, or traditional testimonial 
pri vileges. 3 
The same is true of Fourth Amend-
ment authority to withhold evidence, 
even from a grand jury. Hale v. Henkel, 
201 U.S. 43, 26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652 ; 
Silverthorne, supra. Noone would 
doubt, for example, that under Bell v . 
Hood, supra, and Bivens (or Monroe v. 
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L. 
Ed.2d 492, where state police were con-
cerned) a telephone subscriber could ob-
tain an injunction against unlawful wire-
tapping of his telephone despite the fact 
that such termination might remove 
from the Government's reach evidence 
with which it could convict third parties. 
A contrary judgment today would crip-
ple enforcement of the Fourth Amend-
ment. For, if these movants, whom the 
Solicitor General concedes are not the 
prosecutors' targets, were required to 
submit to interrogation, then they (un-
like prospective defendants) would have 
no further opportunity to vindicate their 
InJurIes. More generally, because sur-
veillances are often "directed primarily 
to the collecting and maintaining of in-
telligence with respect to subversive 
forces, and are not an attempt to gather 
evidence for specific criminal prosecu-
tions," United States v. United States 
District Court, 405 U.S. -, -, 92 
S.Ct. -, -, 32 L.Ed.2d -, the nor-
mal exclusionary threat of We~ks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 
58 L.Ed. 652, would be sharply atten-
uated and intelligence centers would be 
loosed from virtually every deterrent 
340 U.S. 332, 71 S.Ct. 301, 95 L.Ed. 306 
(marital); United States v. Reynolds, 
345 U.S. 1, 73 S.Ct. 528, 97 L.Ed. 727 
(military aircraft specifications). 
! 
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against abuse.4 Furthermore, even this reason, our decisions have embraced 
where the "uninvited ear" is used to the view that '~[tJhe tendency of those 
obtain criminal convictioris, rather than who execute the criminal laws of the 
for domestic spying, a rule different country to obtain conviction by_ means 
from our result today would supply police of unlawful seizures and enforced confes-
with an added incentive to record the sions should find no sanction 
conversations of suspected coconspira- in the judgments of the courts, which 
tors in order to marshall evidence against are at all times charged with support of 
alleged ringleaders. We are told that the Constitution." Weeks ' v. United 
"[p J olice are often tempted to make il- States, 232 U;S. 383, 390, 34 S.Ct. 341, 
legal searches during the investigations 344, 58 L.Ed. 652. As mentioned earlier, 
of a large conspiracy. Once the police this principle was at the heart of the 
have established That several individuals Silverthorne decision. Later in his dis-
are involved, they may deem it worth- sent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 
while to violate the constitutional rights U.S. 438, 470, 48 S.Ct. 564, 575, 72 L.Ed. 
of one member of the conspiracy (partic- 944, a case in which federal wiretappers 
ularly a minor member) in order to ob- had violated an Oregon law, Justice 
tain evidence for use against others." Holmes, citing Silverthorne, thought that 
White & Greenspan, Standing to Object both the officers and the court were hon-
to Search and Seizure, 118 U.Pa.L.Rev. or bound to observe the state law: "If 
333,351 (1970) (footnotes omitted). Be- the existing code does not permit district 
cause defendants are normally denied attorneys to hllVe a hand in such dirty 
"standing" to suppress evidence procured business it does not permit the judge to 
as a result of invasions of others' priva- allow such iniquities to succeed." In the 
cies today's remedy is necessary to help same case, Justice Brandeis, who was 
neutralize the prosecutorial reward of then alone in his view that wiretapping 
such tactics. was a search within the meaning of the 
Today's remedy assumes an added and 
critical measure of importance for, due to 
the clandestine nature of electronic eaves-
dropping, other inhibitions on officers' 
abuse, such as the threat of damage ac-
tions, reform through the political proc-
ess, and adverse publicity; will be of lit-
tle avail in guarding privacy. 
Moreover, when a court assists the 
Government in extracting fruits from the 
victims ~f its lawless searches Oi't de-
grades the integrity of the Judicial sys-
tem. For "[nJothing can destroy a gov· 
ernment more quickly than its failure 
to observe its own laws, or worse, its dis-
regard of the charter of its own exist-
ence." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659, 
81 S.Ct. 1684, 1694, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081. For 
4. Our remark in United States v. United 
States District Court, 405 U.S. -, 92 
S.Ct. -, 32 L.Ed.2d -, was our un-
derstanding only of the motivation be-
hind _ federal national security wiretap-
ping. But the statistical evidence shows 
that nonsecurity wiretapping also is 
seldom used to convict criminals. In 
Fourth Amendment, phrased it this way: 
"In a· government 'of laws, existence of 
the government will be imperilled if it 
fails to observe the law scrupulously. 
Our government is the potent, omnipres-
ent teacher. For good or for ill it teach-
es the whole people by its example. 
Crime is contagious. If the government 
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt 
for law; it invites every man to become 
a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." 
Id., 485, 48 S.Ct., 575.-
In an entrapment case, Justice Frank-
furter, with whom Justices Harlan, Bren-
nan, and I joined, thought that "the fed-
eral courts have an obligation to set their 
face against enforcement of the law by 
lawless means" because "[pJublic confi-
1969, court-ordered federal wiretapping 
seized 44,940 conversations but only 24 
convictions were obtained. In 1970, fed-
eral court orders permitted the 'seizure of 
147,780 communications with 48 convic-
tions. H. Schwartz, A Report on the 
Costs and Benefits of Electronic Surveil-
lance ii-iv (1971). 
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dence in the fair and honorable adminis-
tration of justice, upon Whi.ch ultimately 
depends the rule of law, is the transcend-
ing value at stake." Sherman v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 369, 380, 78 S.Ct. 819, 
825, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (dissenting opinion); 
see also his opinion for the Court in Nar-
done v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-
341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 267-268, 84 L.Ed. 307. 
In a Self-Incrimination Clause decision, 
Justice Brennan ( joined by Justice Mar-
shall and myself) used fewe~ words: "it 
i s monstrous that courts should aid or 
abet the lawbreaking police officer." 
Harris v. New York, 401 U~S. 222, 23 2, 
91 S.Ct. 643, 649, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (dissent-
ing) . 
I 
These s tandards are at war with the 
Gover~ment's claim that intelligence 
agencies may invoke the aid of the courts 
in order to compound their neglect of 
constitutional values. To be sure, at 
some point taint may become so attenu-
ated that ignoring the original blunder 
will not breed contempt for law. But 
here judges are not asked merely to over-
look infractions diminished by time and 
independent events. Rather, if these wit-
nesses' allegations are correct, judges are 
being invited to become the handmaidens 
of intentional 5 police lawlessness by or-
dering these victims to elaborate on ,their 
telephonic communications of which the 
prosecutors would have no knowledge but 
for their unconstitutional surveillance. 
In summary, I believe that Silver-
thorne was rightly decided, that it was 
rooted in our continuing policy to equip 
victims of unconstitutional searches with 
effective means of redress, that it has 
enjoyed repeated praise in subsequent 
decisions, that it has not been seriously 
challenged here, and that it requires that 
we affirm the Third Circuit in Egan and 
Walsh and reverse the Ninth Circuit in 
Gelbard and Parnas. 
Mr. Justice WHITE, concurring in the 
Court's opinion and judgment. 
5. As J ustice Fort as said, wiretapping " is 
usually the product of calculated, official 
decision rather than the error of an in-
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) a witness 
who refuses to testify "without just 
cause" may be held in. contempt of court. 
Here, grand jury witnesses are involved, 
and the just cause claimed to excuse 
them is that the testimony demanded in-
volves the disclosure and use of com-
. munications allegedly intercepted in vio-
lation of the controlling federal statute 
and hence inadmissible under 18 U.S.C. § 
2515. 
The United States ass~rts that § 2515 
affords no excuse to grand jury witness-
es under any circumstances. Reliance is 
placed on § 2518(10) (a) and the legisla-
tive history of the statute. I agree with 
the Court, however, that at least where 
the United States has intercepted com-
munications without a warrant in cir-
cumstances where court approval was 
required, it is appropriate in construing 
and applying 28 U.S.C. § 1826 not to re-
quire the grand jury witness to answer 
and hence further the plain policy of 
the wiretap statute. This unquestion-
ably works a change in the law with re-
spect to the ' rights of grand jury wit-
nesses, but it is a change rooted in a 
complex statute the meaning of which 
is not immediately obvious as the opin-
ions filed today so tellingly demonstrate. 
Where the Government produces a 
court order for the interception, how-
ever, and the witness nevertheless de-
mands a full blown suppression hearing 
to determine the legality of the order, 
there may be room for striking a differ-
ent accommodation between the due 
functioning of the grand jury system 
and the federal wiretap statute. Sup-
pression hearings in these circumstances 
would result in protracted interruption 
of grand jury proceedings. At the same 
time prosecutors and other officers who 
have been granted and relied on a court 
order for the interception would be sub-
ject to no liability under the statute, 
whether the order is valid or not ; ·and 
in any event, the deterrent value of ex-
dividual agent of the state." Alderman 
v. United States, . 394 U.S. 165, 203, 89 
S.Ct. 961, 982, 22 L .Ed.2d 176. 
., 
J . 
f 
GELBARD v. UNITED STATES 2373 
Cite as 92 S.Ct. 2357 (1972) 
cluding the evidence will be marginal at 
best. It is weil, therefore, that the Court 
has left this issue open for consideration 
by the District Court on remand. See 
n. 22, p. 2368, ante. 
Of course, where the Government of-
ficially denies the fact of electronic 
surveillance of the. witness, the matter is 
at an end and ·the witness must answer. 
Mr. Justice REHNQUIST, with whom 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice 
BLACKMUN, and Mr. Justice POWELL 
join, dissenting. 
Disposition of this case depends on the 
sorting out of admittedly conflicting im-
plications from different sections of the 
principal statute involved. The Court's 
conclUsion, .while supportable if regard 
be had only for the actual language of 
the sections, is by no means compelled by 
that language. Its conclusion is reached 
in utter disregard for the relevant leg-
islative history, and quite without con-
sideration of the sharp break which it 
represents with the historical m'odus 
operandi of the grand jury. It is, in 
my opinion, wrong. 
The Court states the question to be 
whether witnesses threatened with con-
tempt uD"der 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) "are 
entitled to invoke this ' prohibition of § 
2515 as a defense to contempt charges 
brought against them for refusing to 
testify." Ante, p. 2359. The question as 
thus framed by the Court has been so 
abstracted and refined, and divorced 
from the particulars of these two cases, 
as to virtually invite the erroneous an-
swer which the opinion of the .Court 
gives. 
N or is it accurate to "assume" as the 
Court does that the Government's over-
hearing of these witnesses was in viola-
tion of the applicable statute. Petitioner 
Gelbard contended' in the trial court that 
I. In the case of respondents E gan and 
Walsh, the government in the District 
Court did not state whethe r it had engaged 
in electronic surveillance. In this Court, 
however, the government represented that 
respondents Egan and Walsh had not been 
the United States planned to use his 
electronically overheard conversations as 
one basis for questioning him before the 
grand jury, and so stated in a presenta-
tion to that court. The Government in 
a reply affidavit stated that whatever 
information had been gathered. as a re-
sult of electronic overhearing had been 
obtained' from wiretaps conducted pur-
suant to court order as provided in 18 
U.S.C. § 2518.1 Parnas, .so far as this 
record shows, made no similar allegation 
in the trial court. The Court of Appeals 
in its opinion described the position 
taken by these witnesses in the following 
language ~ 
"When cited for contempt in the dis-
trict court, each attacked the constitu-
tional validity of § 2518, and addition-
ally urged' that he should not be re-
quired to testify until and unless first 
allowed to inspect all applications, or-
ders, tapes and transcripts relating to 
such an electronic surveillance and af-
forded an opportunity to suppress the 
use before the grand jury of any. evi-
dence so secured " 
Thus what was presented to the trial 
court in this proceeding under 18 U:S.C. 
§ 1826(a) was not a neatly stipulated 
question of law, but a demand by the 
petitioners that they be permitted to 
roam at will among the prosecutor's 
records . in order to see whether they 
might be able to turn up any evidence in-
dicating that the · Government's over-
hearing of their conversations had been 
unauthorized by statute. In order to de-
termine whether this particular type of 
remedy is open to these petitioners at 
this particular stage of potential crim-
inal proceedings i,!; is not enough to re-
cite, as the Court does, that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2515 prohibits the use of illegally 
overheard wire communications before 
grand juries as well as before other gov-
ernmental bodies. This proposition is 
subjected to electronic surveillance. In 
light of this development, I w~uld remand 
these cases to the District Court in order 
to give the respondents another opportuni. 
ty to testify. 
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not disputed. The far more difficult in-
quiry posed by these facts is whether 
the granting to these petitioners at this 
particular stage of these proceedings of 
sweeping discovery as a prelude to a full 
hearing on the issue of alleged unlawful 
surveillance can fairly be inferred from 
the enactment by Congress of the two 
statutes relied on in the Court's opinion. 
I 
It may be helpful at the outset to treat 
briefly the background of 28 U.S.C. § 
1826(a). As the Court notes, this pro-
vision ' was enacted as a part of the Or-
ganized Crime Control Act of 1970; and 
the Senate Report states that it was in-
tended to codify the "existing practice 
of the federal courts." The existing 
practice of the federal courts prior to the 
enactment of this section was based on 
Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. 42 and on 18 
U.S.C. § 401, both of which dealt gen-
erally with the power of courts to pun-
ish for contempt. The enactment of § 
1826(a) appears to have resulted from a 
desire on the part of Congress to treat 
separately from the general contempt 
power of courts their authority to deal 
with recalcitrant witnesses in court or 
grand jury proceedings. Since, as the 
Senate Report states, the enactment of 
this provision was designed to "codify 
the existing practice", it is instructive to 
note the types of claims litigated in con-
nection with grand jury matters under 
Rule 42 and 18 U.S.C. § 401 prior to the 
enactment of this new section. So far 
as the reported decisions of this Court 
and of the lower federal courts reveal, 
prior litigation with respect to grand 
juries has dealt almost exclusively with 
questions of privilege, and most of these 
cases have dealt with issues of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. While 
it is plain that the respondent in such 
proceedings was entitled to a hearing and 
to adduce evidence, it is equally plain 
2. See, e. g., Blau v. United States, 340 
U.S. 159, 71 S.Ct. 223, 95 L.Ed. 170 
(1950); Rogers v. United States, 340 
U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 438, 95 L.Ed. 344 
(1951) ; Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 
that the typical hearing was short in 
duration and largely devoted to the ar-
guments of counsel on an agreed state-
meilt of facts.2 
Some of the flavor of the type of pro-
ceeding contemplated under the prior • 
practice is gleaned from the following 
passage in the Court's opinion in Shilli-
tani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370, 
86 S.Ct. 1531, 1535, 16 L.Ed.2d 622 (cita-
tions omitted): 
"There can be no question that courts 
have an inherent power to enforce 
compliance with their lawful orders to 
civil contempt And it is 
essential that courts be able to compel 
the appearance and testimony of wit-
nesses . . A grand jury sub-
poena must command the same respect 
. Where contempt consists of 
a refusal to obey a court order to tes-
tify at any stage in judicial proceed-
ings, the witness may be confined un-
til compliance . " 
These proceedings seem almost invari-
ably to have been short and summary in 
nature, not because the defendant was 
to be denied a fair hearing, but because 
the type of issue that could be raised at 
such a proceeding was one which did not 
generally permit extensive factual de-
velopment. Even where a court of ap-
peals reversed a contempt adjudication 
because of the district court's failure to 
allow the defendant to testify on his 
own behalf with respect to material is-
sues, there was no hint of either the 
right to, or the necessity for, any dis-
covery proceedings against the Govern-
ment. Hooley v. United States, 209 F.2d 
219 (CAl 1954). 
Congress was of course free to expand 
the scope of inquiry in these proceedings, 
to enlarge the issues ' to be tried, and 
to alter past practice in any other way 
that it chose consistently with the Con-
stitution. But in view of the stated con-
118, 77 S.Ct. 1145, 1 L.Ed.2d 1225 
(1957); United States v. George, 444 F. 
2d 310 (CA6 1971); In re October 1969 
Grand Jury, 435 F.2d 350 (CA7 1970). 
, " 
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gressional intent to "codify existing grand jury's labors, not at the begin-
practice" by the enactment of § 1826(a), ning. " 
we should require rather strong evidence 
of congressional purpose to conclude that 
Congress intended to engraft on the tra-
ditional and rather summary contempt 
hearings a new type of hearing in which 
a grand jury witness is accorded carte 
blanche discovery of all of the Govern-
ment's "applications, orders, tapes, and 
transcripts relating to electronic sur-
veillance" before he may be required to 
testify. 
II 
Just as Congress was not writing on a 
clean slate in the area of contempt hear-
ings, it was not writing on a clean slate 
with respect to the nature of grand jury 
proceedings. These petitioners were 
called before a grand jury that had been 
convened to inv.estigate violations of fed-
eral gambling laws. We deal, therefore, 
not with the rights of a criminal defend-
ant in the traditional adversary con-
text of a trial, but with the status of 
witnesses summoned to testify before a 
body devoted to sifting evidence that 
could result in the presentment of crim-
inal charges. Just as the cases arising 
under the predecessor of 28 U.S.C. § 
1826(a) suggest a limitation on the type 
of issue which may be litigated in such 
a proceeding, cases dealing with the r.ole 
of the grand jury stress the unique 
breadth of its scope of inquiry. In 
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281-
282, 39 S.Ct. 468, 471, 63 L.Ed. 979 
(1919), this Court defined the vital in-
vestigatory function of the grand jury: 
"It is a grand inquest, a body with 
powers of investigation and inquisi-
tion, the scope of whose inquiries is 
n9t to be limited narrowly by ques-
tions of propriety or forecasts of the 
probable result of the investigation, or 
by doubts whether any particular in-
dividual will be found properly sub-
ject to an accusation of crime. As has 
been said before, the identity of the 
offender, and the precise nature of 
the offense, if there be one, normally 
are developed at the conclusion of the 
Another passage from Blai1' pointed 
out the citizen's obligation to obey the 
process of the grand jury: . 
"It is clearly recognized that the giv-
ing of testimony and the attendance 
upon court or grand jury in order to 
testify are public duties which every 
person within the jurisdiction of the 
government is bound to perform upon 
being properly summoned." Id., at 
281 39 S.Ct., at 471. 
In Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 
359, 362, 76 S.Ct. 406, 408, 100 L.Ed. 
397 (1956), the Court traced the de-
velopment of the English grand jury and 
concluded that the probable intent of the 
Framers of our Constitution was to par-
allel that institution as it had existed in 
England where "grand jurors were se-
lected from the body of the people and 
their work was not hampered by rigid 
procedural or evidential rules." 350 
U.S., at 362, 76 S.Ct., at 408. The 
Court in Costello was at pains to point 
out the necessity of limiting the nature 
of challenges to evidence adduced before 
a grand jury if that body were to retain 
its traditional comprehensive investiga-
tive authority: . 
"If indictments were to be held open 
to challenge on the ground that there 
was inadequate or incompetent evi-
dence before the grand jury, the re-
sulting delay would be great indeed. 
The result of such a rule would be that 
before trial on the merits a defendant 
could alway.s insist on the kind of pre-
liminary trial to determine the compe-
tency and adequacy of the evidence be-
fore the grand jury." ,350 U.S., at 
363, 76 S.Ct., at 408. 
While this general statement applied 
by its terms only to one who was ulti-
mately indicted by the 'grand ' jury, its 
reasoning applies with like force to one 
who seeks to make an evidentiary chal-
lenge to grand jury proceedings on the 
basis of his status as a prospective wit-
ness. Indeed, time-consuming challenges 
by witnesses during the course of a 
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grand jury investigation would be far 
more inimical to the function of that 
body than would a motion to dismiss an 
indictment . after it had concluded its 
deliberations. 
In Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 
339, 78 S.Ct. 311, 2 L.Ed.2d 321 the 
Court refused to accord to petitioners 
the hearing, prior to trial, on the issue 
of whether or not Ii grand jury which in-
dicted them had made direct or deriva-
tive use of materials the use of which 
by an earlier grand jury' had been held 
to violate the defendant's privilege 
against self-incrimination. In support-
ing its conclusiQn that the defendant 
should not even be accorded a hearing to 
sustain these contentions, the Court 
quoted a passage from Costello describ-
ing the grand jury as 
"[an] institution, in which laymen 
conduct their ' inquiries unfettered by 
technical rules. Neither justice nor 
the concept of a fair trial requires 
such a change. In a trial on the mer-
its, defendants are entitled to a strict 
observance of all the rules designed to 
bring about a fair verdict. - Defend-
ants are not entitled, howeyer, to a 
rule which would result in intermina-
ble delay but add nothing to the as-
surance of a fair trial." 355 U.S., at 
350, 78 S.Ct., at 318. 
It seems to me to be clear beyond cavil 
from these cases that prior to the enact-
ment of the Omnibus Crime and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, a hearing such as 
that which the Court awards these peti-
tioners was not only unauthorized by law, 
but completely contrary to the ingrained 
principles which have long governed the 
functioning of the grand jury. 
III 
When Congress set out to enact the 
two statutes on.-which the Court relies, it 
was certainly not with any announced 
intent to change the nature' of contempt 
hearings relating to grand jury proceed-
ings, or to change the modus operandi of 
the grand jury! Instead, largely in re-
sponse to the decisions of this Court in 
I 
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 
1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967), and Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 
507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), Congress in 
1967 undertook to draft comprehensive 
. legislation both authorizing the use of 
evidence obtained by electronic surveil-
lance on specified conditions, and prohib-
iting its use otherwise. ' S.Rep. No. 1097, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess., 67, U.S.Code Congo 
& Admin.News, p. 2112. The ultimate 
result was the Omnibus Act of 1968. 
Critical to analysis of the issue involved 
here are §§ 2515 and 2518(10) (a) of 
that Act, which provide in pertinent part 
as follows: 
"Whenever any wire or oral communi-
cation has been intercepted, no part 
of the contents of such communication 
and no evidence derived therefrom 
may be received in evidence in any 
trial, hearing, or other proceeding in 
or before any court, grand jury, de-
partment, officer, agency, regulatory 
body, legislative committee, or other 
authority if the disclosure 
- of that information would be in viola-
tion of this chapter." § 2515. 
"Any aggrieved person in any trial, 
hearing, or proceeding in or before any 
court, department, officer, agency, reg-
ulatory body, or other authority of 
the United States, a State, or a politi-
cal subdivision thereof, may move to 
suppress the contents of any intercept-
ed wire or oral communication, or evi-
dence derived therefrom, on the 
grounds that-
"(i) the communication was unlaw-
fully intercepted; 
"(ii) the order of authorization or 
approval under which it was intercept-
ed is insufficient on its face; or 
"(iii) the interception was not made 
in conformity with the order of au-
thorization or approval . . "§ 
2518(10) (a). 
Here is presented at the very least an 
implied conflict between two separate 
sections of the same Act. Section 2515 
proscribes generally the use of unlaw-
-, 
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fully intercepted communications as evi-
dence before a number of specified 
bodies, including a grand jury. Section 
2518(10) (a) provides for the type of 
hearing which petitioners sought and 
were denied by the District Court; it 
prQvides such hearings in connection 
with a number of specified legal pro-
ceedings, but it conspicuously omits pro-
ceedin'gs before a grand jury. The meth-
od by which the Court solves this dilemma 
is to state that if petitioners succeed after 
their discovery in establishing their claim 
of unlawful electronic surveillance, their 
questioning before the grand jury on the 
basis of such electronic surveillance 
would violate § 2515, as of course it pre-
sumptively would. Therefore, says the 
Court, petitioners must be entitled to the 
discovery and factual hearing which' they 
seek, even though § 2518(10) (a) rather 
clearly denies it to them by implication. 
A construction which I believe at least 
equally plausible, based simply on the 
juxtaposition of the various sections of 
the statute, is that § 2515 contains a basic 
proscription of certain conduct, but does 
not attempt to specify remedies or rights 
arising from a breach of that proscrip-
tion; the specification of remedies is left 
to other sections. Other sections provide 
several ' remedies; criminal and civil 
sanctions are imposed by §§ 2511 and 
2520, whereas § 2518(10) (a) accords a 
right to a suppression hearing in speci-
fied cases. Thus the fact that one who 
may be the victim of alleged unlawful 
surveillance on the part of the Govern-
ment is not accorded' an Alderman-type 
suppression hearing under the provisions 
of § 2518(10) (a) is not left remediless 
to such a degree that it must be presumed 
to have been an oversight; he is remitted 
to the institution of civil proceedings, or 
the filing of a complaint leading to the 
institution of a criminal prosecution. 
While the latter two remedies may not be 
as efficacious in many situations as a 
suppression hearirig, the remission of an 
aggrieved party to those remedies cer-
tainly does not render nugatory the gen-
eral proscription contained in § 2515. 
92 S.Ct.-1491/z 
The omission of "grand jury" from the 
designated forums in § 2518(10) (a) is 
not explainable on the basis that though 
the testimony is sought to be adduced be-
fore a grand jury, the motion to suppress 
would actually be made in a court, which 
is one of the forums designated in § 2518 
(10) (a) . The language "in any trial, 
hearing, or proceeding in or before" quite 
cIearly refers to the forum in which the 
testimony is sought to be adduced. But 
even more significant is the inclusion 
among the designated forums of "depart-
ment" . "officer" "agency" and "regula-. 
tory body." Congress has almost with-
out exception provided that issues as to 
the legality and propriety of subpoenas 
issued by either agencies or executive 
departments should be resolved by the 
courts. It has accomplished this result 
by requiring the agency to bring an in-
dependent judicial action to . enforce 
obedience to its subpoena. See, e. g., 15 
U.S.C. § 79r, Utility Holding Company 
Act; 15 U.S.C. § 78u, Securities Ex-
change Act ; 41 U.S.C. § 35-45, Walsh-
Healy Public Contracts Act; 50 U.S.C. 
App. 2U,5, Defense Production Act of 
1950; 47 U.S.C. § 49, Communications 
Act; 46 U.S.C. § 1124, Merchant Marine 
Act of 1946 ; 26 U.S.C. § 7604 Internal 
Revenue Act; 16 U.S.C. § 825f (c), 
Electric Utility Companies Act; 15 U.S. 
C. § 717m (d), Natural Gas Act; 7 U. 
S.C. § 511n, Tobacco InspeGtion Act. 
This general mode of e~forcement of 
agency investigative subpoenas was dis-
cussed in the context of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act in Oklahoma Press Pub-
lishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 
S.Ct. 494, 90 L.Ed. 614 (1946). 
Thus if Congress in § 2518 had intend-
ed to focus on the forum in which the 
hearing as to the legality of the sub-
poena is to be determined, rather than 
the forum in which the testimony is 
sought to be ' adduced, it would have 
omitted not only grand juries, but de-
partments, officers, agencies, and regu-
latory bodies as weB from the coverage 
of § 2518(10) (a). For questions as to 
the legality of subpoenas issued by all 
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these bodies are resolved in the courts. 
By omitting only grand juries in § 2518, 
Congress indicated that it was gealing 
with the forum in which the testimony 
was sought to be adduced, and that the 
suppression hearing authorized by the 
section was not to be available to grand 
jury witnesses. -
In the light of these conflicting impli-
cations from the statutory language it-
self, resort to the legislative history is 
appropriate. Passages from the legisla-
tive history cited by the · Court in its 
opinion do not focus at all on the avail-
ability of a suppression hearing in grand 
jury proceedings; they simply speak in 
general terms of the congressional intent 
to prohibit and penalize unlawful elec-
tronic surveillance, of which intent there 
can of course be no doubt. But several 
parts of the legislative history address 
themselves, far more particularly than 
any relied upon by the Court in its opin-
ion, to the actual issue before us. The 
Senate Report, for example, indicates as 
plainly as possible that the exclusion of 
grand juries from the language of § 
2518(10) (a) was deliberate: 
"This provision [§ 2518(10) (a)] 
must be read in connection with §§ 
2515 and 2517, discussed above, which 
it limits. It provides the remedy for 
the right created by § 2515. Because 
no person is a party as such to a grand 
jury proceeding, the provision does 
nO.t envision the making of a motion 
to suppress in the context of such a 
proceeding itself. Normally, there· is 
no limitation on the character of evi-
dence that may be presented to a grand 
jury, which is enforceable by an in-
dividual. (Blue v. United States, 86 
S.Ct. 1416, 384 U.S. 251 [16 L.Ed.2d 
510] (1965).) There is no intent to. 
change this general rule. It is ' the 
intent of the provision only that when 
the motion to suppress is granted in 
anot her context, its scope may include 
use in a future grand jury proceed-
ing." (Emphasis added.) S.Rept.No. 
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 106, U.S. 
Code Congo & Admin.News, p. 2195. 
There is an intimation in the opinion 
of the Court that the reason this lan-
guage was used may have been that grand 
juries do not pass upon motions to sup-
press, while courts ' do. This intimation 
is not only inconsistent with the language 
of the section itself, as pointed out, ante, 
p. 2364, but it attributes to the drafters 
of the report a lower level of understand-
ing of the subject matter with which they 
were dealing than I believe is justified. 
It is also rather squarely contradicted by 
the statement that there is no limitation 
on the character of evidence that may 
be presented to a grand jury "which is 
enforceable by an individual." Had the 
report meant to stress th~ presumably 
well-known fact that grand juries do not 
themselves grant motions to suppress, it 
would not have used that language, nor 
would it have cited United States V. 
Blue, supra. 
The fact that the report states the 
reason for the' policy adopted in terms 
of the rights of an "individual," rather 
than in terms of the rights of a "defend-
ant," makes the Court's discussion of 
the doctrine of various cases, ante, p. 
, 2366 doubtful help in construing the stat-
ute. Whatever United States ,v. Blue, 
supra, may be said to "hold" after careful 
analysis by this Court, the drafters of the 
Senate Report undoubtedly took it to 
stand for the proposition for which they 
cited it. As stated by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, concurring in Green V. United 
States, 356 U.S. 165, 189, 78 S.Ct. 632, 
646, 2 L.Ed.2d 672: 
"The fact that scholarship has shown 
that historical assumptions regarding 
the procedure for punishment, of con-
tempt of court were ill-founded, hard-
ly wipes out a century and a half of 
the legislative and judicial history 
of federal law based on such assump-
tions." 
Not only does the report dealing with 
§ 2518(10) (a) make clear that it is to 
be construed J n connection with § 2515, 
which it limits, but the section of the 
same report dealing with § 2515 re-em-
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phasizes this conclusion. Speaking of It would not include a grand jury 
the latter section, the report says: hearing. Compare Blue v. United 
"The provision must, of course, be 
_read in light of § 2518(10) (a) dis-
cussed below, which defines the class 
entitled to make a motion to suppress. 
It largely reflects existing law . 
Nor generally [is there any inten-
tion] to press the scope of the sup-
pression rule beyond present search 
and seizure law. See Walder v. United 
States, 74 S.Ct. 354, 347 U.S. 62 [98 
L.Ed. 503] (1954) The 
provision thus forms an integral part 
of the system of limitations designed 
to protect privacy. Along wit,h the 
criminal and civil remedies, it should 
serve to guarantee that the standards 
of the new chapter will sharply curtail 
the unlawful interception of wire and 
oral communications." 
The conclusion that § 2518(10) (a) is 
the exclusive source of the right to 
move to suppress is further fortified 
by the Senate Report's comment on § 
2510(11) of the Act, which defines an 
"aggrieved person" as one who is a 
party to an "interception of wire or oral 
communication or a person against whom 
the interception was directed." The Sen-
ate Report, page 91" U.S.Code Congo & 
Admin.N ews, p. 2179, states: 
"This definition defines the cla,ss' of 
those who are entitled to invoke the 
suppression sanction of section 2515 
discussed below, through the motion 
to suppress provided for by Section 
2518 (10) (a), also discussed below. 
It is intended to reflect existing law." 
(Citations omitted.) (Emphasis add-
ed.) 
Finally, § 2518(9) requires the Gov-
ernment to provide to each party to "any 
trial, hearing . or other proceeding" a 
copy of the court order authorizing sur-
veillance if the Government intends to 
use the fruits thereof. The Senate Re-
port, p. 105, U.S.Code Congo & Admin. 
News, p. 2195, states: 
" 'Proceeding' is intended to include all 
adversary type hearings 
States (citation omitted)." 
If § 2515 of the Omnibus Act of 1968 
stood alone without any informative leg-
islat ive history, the Court's conclusion 
with respect to the rights of these peti-
tioners would be plainly correct. If the 
conflicting implications from two sec-
tions of the same statute were present 
in a regulatory scheme which was to 
stand by itself, rather than to be super-
imposed on procedures such as contempt 
hearings and institutions such as. the 
grand jury, the Court's conclusion would 
at least be tenable. But when the 
Court concludes that Congress, almost. 
in a fit of absentmindedness, has drastic-
ally enlarged the right of potential grand 
jury witnesses to avoid testifying, and 
when such a conclusion is based upon 
one of two ambivalent implications from 
the language of the statute, and is con-
trary to virtually every whit of legisla-
tive history addressed to the point in 
issue, I think its conclusion is plainly 
wrong. 
IV 
The Court seeks to bolster its reason-
ing by reliance upon 18 U.S.C. § 3504 
(a) (1), which was a part of the Organ-
ized Crime Act of 1970. That section 
provides in pertinent part as follows: 
"In any 
before any 
proceedipg entered 
grand jury 
"( 1) Upon a claim by a -party ag-
grieved that evidence is inadmissible 
because it is the primary product of 
an unlawful act or because it was ob-
tained by the exploitation of an un-
lawful act, the opponent of the claim 
shall affirm or deny the occurrence of 
the alleged unlawful act." 
Assuming, arguendo, that this section 
does apply to these petitioners, the rec-
ord in the District Court and the opinion 
of the Court of Appeals clearly shows 
that only Gelbard made what might be 
called a "claim" within the language of 
the section, and that the Government in 
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its response did "affirm or deny" the 
occurrence of the alleged unlawful act; ... 
in fact, the Government denied the oc-
currence of the unlawful act. This 
should be sufficient for disposition of 
the case as to these petitioners. 
The Court, without giving much guid-
ance to those who would seek to follow 
the path by which it reaches the con-
clusion, concludes that this section "con-
firms. that Congress meant that grand 
ju!"y witnesses might defend contempt 
charges by invoking the prohibition of 
§ 2515 against the compelled disclosure 
of evidence obtained in violation of Title 
IlL" If the Court means to say any 
more than that under the circumstances 
specified in ·§ 3504, the Government must 
affirm or deny, I am at a loss how ·it 
extracts additional requirements from 
the language used by Congress in that 
section. 
But even if the Court were correct 
in deciding that § 3504(a) (1) requires 
more than it says of the Government, 
I believe the Court errs in deciding that 
this section applies .at all to these peti-
tioners. Section 3504 as enacteg actu-
ally consists of "two parts, A and B. Part 
A is a series of findings by Congress, 
reading as follows: 
"The Congress finds that claims that 
evidence offered in proceedings was 
obtained by the exploitation of unlaw-
ful acts, and is therefore inadmissible 
in evidence, (1) often cannot reliably 
be determined when such claims con-
cern evidence of events occurring 
years after the allegedly unlawful act, 
and (2) when the allegedly unlawful 
act has occurred more than five years 
prior to the event in question, there is 
virtually no likelihood that the evi-
dence offered to prove the event has 
been obtained 'by the exploitation of 
that all~gedly unlawful act." 
House Report No. 91-1549 (to ac-
company S. 30) contains this comment 
on Part A: 
"This section contains a special find-
ing relating, as do the foUowing sec-
tions of the title to certain evidentiary 
problems' created by electronic sur-
veillance conducted . by the Government 
prior to the enactment of Public Law 
90-351 on June 19, 1968;-which pro-
vided statutory authority for obtaining 
surveillance warrants in certain types 
of criminal investigations." (Emphasis 
supplied.) 2 U.S.Code Congo & Admin. 
News (91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1970), at 
p. 4026. 
The same report, in its introductory dis-
cussion of Title VII, contains the fol-
lowing statement: 
"Title VII intends to limit disclosure 
of information illegally obtained by 
the Government to defendants who 
seek to challenge the admissibility of 
evidence because it is either the pri-
mary or indirect production of such 
an illegal act. The title also prohibits 
any challenge to the admissibility of 
evidence based on its being the fruit 
of an unlawful governmental act, if 
such act occurred 5 years or more be-
fore the events sought to be proved. 
As amended by the committee, the ap-
plication of title VII is limited to Fed-
eral judicial and administrative pro-
ceedings, and to electronic or mechan-
ical surveillance . which occurred prior 
to June 19, 1968, the date of enact-
ment of the Federal wiretapping and 
electronic surveillance law.' ~ (Chap-
ter 119, Title XVIII, U.S.Code.) 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
The Senate Report, too, casts § 3504 
(a) (1) in quite a different light from 
that in which the Court puts it: 
"Lastly, it should be noted that noth-
ing in § 3504(a) (1) is intended to 
codify or change present law defining 
illegal conduct or prescribing require-
ments for standing to object to such 
conduct or the use of evidence given 
under an immunity grant. See, e. g., 
Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 
310 (1969); Alderman V. United 
States, 394 U.S. 165 [89 S.Ct. 961, 
22 L.Ed.2d 176] [89 S.Ct. 1163, 22 
L.Ed.2d 297] (1969). Nevertheless, 
since it requires a pending claim as 
" J 
' . 
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a predicate to disclosure, it sets aside signed to regulate motions to suppress 
the present wasteful practice of the evidence in certain limited situations 
Department of Justice in searching where the motion is based upon un-
files without a motion from the de- lawful electronic eavesdropping or 
fendant . " (Emphasis sup- wiretapping which occurred prior to 
plied.) the enactment of the Federal Electron-
These conclusions in the Senate Re-
port are supported by statements of the 
bill's managers in the House during fhe 
time it was being debated. Congress-
man Poff explained Title VII as fol-
lows: 
"Title VII would, first, reverse the 
Supreme Court's decision in Alderman 
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 [89 
S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176] (1969) re-
quiring, under its su'pervisory power, 
the disclosure of government files in 
criminal trials and would, 
second, set a five-year statute of limi-
tations on inserting issues dealing with 
'fruit of the poisonous tree' in similar 
cases." 116 Cong.Rec., 91st Cong., 2d 
Sess., 35192, Oct. 6, 1970. \. 
Congressman Celler explained the 
amendments incorporating the June 18, 
1968, time limitation into subsections 
(a) (2) and (a) (3) of § 3504 that had 
been made by a subcommittee of the ' 
House Judiciary Committee in these 
.words: 
"As amended by the committee, the 
application of Title VII is limited to 
federal judicial and administrative 
proceedings, and to electronic surveil-
lance which occurred prior to June 
19, 1968, the date of enactment of 
the Federal Wiretapping and Elec-
tronic Surveillance law-Chapter 119, 
Title XVIII, United States Code." [d., 
at 35196. 
Even more specific was the explana-
tion of the amendment made by Con-
gressman Poff on the floor of the House 
after the time provisions had been in-
cluded: 
"TITLE VII-LITIGATION CON-
CERNING SOURCES OF EVI-
DENCE 
"Mr. Chairman, Title VII of the 
Organized Crime Control Act is de-
ic Surveillance laws on June 19, 1968 -
"Where there was in fact an un-
lawful overhearing prior to June - 19, 
1968, the title provides for an in cam-
era examination of the Government's 
transcripts and records to determine 
whether they may be relevant to the 
claim of inadmissibility. To 
the extent that the court is permitted 
to determine relevancy in an ex parte 
proceeding, the title will modify the 
procedure established by the Supreme 
Court in Alderman v. United States 
[citation omitted]. 
"As [ have indicated, the title ap-
plies only to disclosures where the 
electronic surveillance occurr,ed / prior 
to June 18, 1968. It is not necessary 
that it apply to disclosure where an 
electronic surveillance occurred after 
that date, because such disclosu1'le will 
be mandated not by Alderman, but by 
section 2518 of Title 18, United States 
Code, added by' 'l'itle III of the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968. Section 2518(10) (e) 
[sic] provides a specific procedure for 
motions to suppress the contents of 
any intercepted wire or oral com-
munication, or evidence derived there-
from, on the grounds that the com-
munication was unlawfully intercept-
ed, that the authorization for the in-
terception was insufficient, or that the 
interception was not made in conform-
ity with the authorization obtained. 
It provides, insofar as the disclosure 
of intercepted communications is con-
cerned, that upon the filing of a mo-
tion to suppress by an aggrieved per-
son the trial judge may in his dis-
cretion make available to such person 
and his counsel for inspection such 
portions of an intercepted communica-
tion, or evidence derived therefrom, 
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as the judge determines to be in the 
interest of justice-see Senate Report 
No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 106, 
1968. The provisions of this title will, 
therefore control the disclosure of 
transcripts of electronic surveillances 
conducted prior to June 19, 1968. 
Thereafter, existing law; not Alderman 
will control. Consequently, in view of 
these amendments to Title VII, its en-
actment in conjunction with the pro-
visions of Title III of the 1968 Act, 
provides the Federal Government with 
a comprehensive and integrated set 
of procedural rules governing suppres-
sion litigation concerning electronic 
surveillance." Id., at 35293-35294. 
(Emphasis added.) 
the language used by Congress in this 
section, but illustrates the palpable er-
ror into which the Court has f{'lllen in 
construing it. The Court has at least 
figuratively stood on its head both the 
language and the legislative history of 
this section in order to conclude that it 
was intended to expand the rights of 
criminal defendants. 
V 
Neither the Omnibus Crime and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968 nor the Organized 
Crime Act of 1970, when construed in 
accordance with the canons of statutory 
construction traditionally followed by 
this Court, support the expansive and 
novel claims asserted by these petition-
ers. 'The Court having reached a con-
trary conclusion, I respectfully dissent. 
The weight of the findings actually 
enacted 'by Congress in Part A and the 
uniform tenor of the legislative history 
outweights, in my opinion, the ambiguity "-
arising from the failure to actually in-
clude a cutoff date in § 3504(a) (1). 
Section 3504(a) (1) by its terms, even 
if read totally out of their context and 
background, as the Court seeks to do; 
affords these petitioners no help because 
the Government has complied with its 
requirements in these cases. But more 
importantly, the entire thrust of the 
findings actu~lly adopted by Congress, 
and of the reports of both Houses, make 
it as plain as humanly possible that this 
section was intended as a limitation on 
existing rights of criminal defendants, 
not as an enlargement of them. Con-
gress, displeased with the effect of this 
Court's decision in Alderman, supra, de-
sired to put a statute of limitations type 
cut-off beyond which the Government 
would not be required to go in time in 
order to disprove taint. Equally dis-
pleased with the policy adopted by the 
Government ot searching its files for 
evidence of taint even when none had 
been alleged by the defendant, it sought 
to put a stop to that practice by requir-
ing the Government to "affirm or deny" 
only where there is "a claim by a party 
aggrieved that evidence is inadmissible." 
Understanding of this background not 
only affords a complete explanation of 
UNITED STATES, Petitioner, 
v. 
Marian A. BYRUM, Executrix Under the 
Last Will and Testament of Milliken 
C.Byrwn. 
No. 71-308. 
Argued March 1, 1972. 
Decide(! June 26, 1972. 
Action by executrix of estate for re-
fund of additional e~tate taxes paid by 
reason of inclusion of trust res in value 
of gross estate. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of 
Ohio, 311 F .Supp. 892, entered judgment 
for the executrix, and the Government 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, 440 F. 
2d 949, affirmed, and certiorari was 
granted. The Supreme Court, Mr. Jus-
tice Powell, held that where settlor hav-
ing controlling stock in closely held cor-
porations transferred shares of such cor-
porations to irrevocable trust while re-
taining the right to vote shares during 
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